We analyze the e¤ects of wage ‡oors on optimal job design in a moral-hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to di¤erent agents is e¢ cient. A su¢ ciently high wage ‡oor, however, induces the principal to dismiss one agent or to even exclude tasks from the production process. Imperfect performance measurement always lowers pro…t under multitasking, but may increase pro…t under specialization. We further show that variations in the wage ‡oor and the agents'reservation utility have signi…cantly di¤erent e¤ects on welfare and optimal job design.
‡oors. Speci…cally, specialization dominates the other job designs for two reasons. First, division of labor lowers total e¤ort costs because tasks are substitutes in an agent's cost function. 3 Second, specialization allows the principal to tailor incentives to the di¤erent tasks by o¤ering workers individual rewards contingent on the joint performance measure.
To illustrate our model, consider a fast-food chain and the two tasks 'selling 'and 'cleaning' in each individual store. Both tasks contribute to the value of the chain and also a¤ect the store's divisional pro…t, which is, say, the only available performance measure. While cleanliness of the store has a positive impact on divisional pro…t, the e¤ect on total …rm value is more signi…cant because there are externalities of the cleanliness of one restaurant on other stores. Hence, divisional pro…t re ‡ects the tasks'contribution to …rm value only imperfectly. If a single worker is responsible for both tasks, incentives based on divisional pro…t will distort the worker's attention towards the selling task. By contrast, with specialization the …rm can vary the strength of incentives across workers and thereby induce e¢ cient e¤ort in both tasks. Furthermore, total e¤ort costs are lower under specialization because a worker who is already responsible for selling …nds it harder to also clean. A specialized job design thus maximizes …rm pro…ts when no wage ‡oor exists. The …rm then even induces the …rst-best e¤ort allocation across tasks and earns the …rst-best pro…t.
In this framework, we derive four main results. Firstly, if a lower bound on wages is introduced, the separation of tasks becomes relatively more expensive to the …rm. As soon as the wage ‡oor becomes binding, providing e¢ cient incentives entails rent payments to workers. The …rm then immediately responds by distorting e¤ort incentives and, at some point, even abandons specialization. Notably, the …rm gives up specialization even before the wage ‡oor exceeds the workers'reservation utility.
Secondly, we show that the level of the wage ‡oor at which the …rm abandons e¢ cient incentives and thus does no longer realize the …rst-best pro…t varies with the quality of the performance measure. In particular, under specialization with asymmetric tasks, the …rm bene…ts from an imperfect performance measure that overemphasizes the less productive task relative to …rm value. Such a performance measure allows the …rm to reduce total rent payments by increasing the incentive responsiveness of the worker performing the less productive task. In our example of a fast-food chain, suppose that 'selling' more strongly a¤ects …rm value than 'cleaning'. A restaurant's cleanliness, however, may have a stronger impact on customer satisfaction than the e¤ectiveness of the selling process.
According to our result, basing the workers'incentives on a survey on customer satisfaction would allow the …rm to sustain …rst-best pro…ts for higher wage ‡oors, an advantage that might outweigh the cost of surveying customers. Under multitasking, however, the …rm's pro…t is always increasing in the quality of the performance measure. 4 Imperfect performance measurement can thus be bene…cial in our framework only when the …rm employs specialization, tasks are asymmetric, and a wage ‡oor exists.
Thirdly, when the wage ‡oor is so high that the principal hires only one agent, she may exclude the less productive task from the agent's job. Restricting the job to the more important task rules out a distortion of e¤ort across tasks, which is inevitable under multitasking. This advantage outweighs the loss from non-execution of the less productive task when the quality of the performance measure is su¢ ciently poor, multitasking strongly diminishes productivity due to higher e¤ort costs, or the wage ‡oor for a multitasking agent is rather large (e.g., due to long working hours).
Fourthly, we show that exogenous changes in market conditions such as the workers' reservation utilities (e.g., unemployment bene…ts) and wage ‡oors (e.g., minimum wages) usually have opposing e¤ects on overall welfare and organizational design. Opposing e¤ects on welfare already arise when the job design is …xed. The reason is that the two parameters in ‡uence the …rm's incentive contracting problem in fundamentally di¤erent ways: The …rm may respond to an increase in the reservation utility by enhancing incentives, leading to higher welfare. By contrast, an increase in the wage ‡oor always entails weakly inferior incentive schemes. When the organizational design is endogenous, opposing e¤ects persist:
Higher reservation utilities usually increase total welfare, help sustain e¢ cient incentives, and raise the workers' income. By contrast, higher wage ‡oors typically diminish total surplus and make the establishment of an e¢ cient job regime less likely.
Our …ndings bear relevance for a large variety of jobs, namely those where wage ‡oors and performance pay coexist. For example, managers frequently receive substantial bonuses in case of success but are protected by limited liability in case of failure. In the low-wage sector, waiters, retail workers, or sales people are often protected by a legal minimum wage but also obtain incentive pay. 5 As suggested by the introductory quotation on Popeyes Chicken & Biscuits, anecdotal evidence from several low-wage employers in the fast-food sector is consistent with our model's predictions. Indeed, in response to minimum wage increases, employers cut hours, increase workloads, and assign more tasks to a single worker (see Wysocki Jr. (1997) , Du¤ (1996) ). Underlining that, along with "the harsh business environment", such developments may have a clearly negative impact on …rm value, Wysocki Jr. (1997) notes that "crew hours were cut back, and cleanliness su¤ered", while Popeyes' store manager is worried that the "[q]uality of work will fall". This supports our prediction that wage ‡oors may lead to the negligence of 'less important tasks'such as cleaning compared to cooking. Moreover, several empirical studies show that a minimum wage can have a signi…cant negative (positive) impact on job-…nding (job-loss) probabilities, which is in line with our …nding that a …rm may o¤er fewer jobs in response to a minimum wage increase. 6 The present paper brings together important aspects of the literature on job design and that on wage ‡oors. For more than two decades, economists have been concerned with incentive distortions and ine¢ ciencies that result from limited liability in principal-agent models. 7 We are, however, the …rst to introduce liability limits or, more generally speaking, wage ‡oors in a multitasking setting with imperfect performance measures. The basic rationale for distorted e¤ort incentives under multitasking was …rst presented by Holmström and Milgrom (1991) and Baker (1992) . 8 Moreover, Holmström and Milgrom (1991) already suggested that splitting tasks into di¤erent jobs can prevent the misallocation of e¤ort. This idea was later formalized by Ratto and Schnedler (2008) . We complement the foregoing literature by highlighting that wage ‡oors may diminish or even eliminate the advantage of separating tasks. Itoh (1994) also analyzes optimal job design in a production process with a joint performance measure for two tasks that are cost substitutes. In contrast to our model, agents are risk averse, wage ‡oors are absent, tasks are equally productive, and the performance measure is perfect. 9 Itoh (1994) shows that multitasking is preferred to specialization when the degree of substitutability between tasks is su¢ ciently low because then the effect of paying a risk premium to only one agent dominates. Along similar lines, we …nd that specialization becomes too costly for the principal when the wage ‡oor is so high that specialized agents would earn rents under any incentive scheme. However, it is worth noting that, in our model, the principal may abandon specialization even before wage ‡oors lead to worker rents. Moreover, by including asymmetric tasks and imperfect performance measurement in the model, we are able to derive novel results on the usefulness of imperfect performance measures and the optimality of task exclusion.
The literature provides further reasons as to why broad task assignments may be optimal. Zhang (2003) and Hughes, Zhang, and Xie (2005) demonstrate that complemen-6 Positive e¤ects on job-loss probabilities of a¤ected workers in the US have been reported by, e.g., Currie and Fallick (1996) and Zavodny (2000) and by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) for both French and US workers. Investigating the 1987 minimum wage increase for Portuguese teenagers, Portugal and Cardoso (2001) report that minimum wages reduce the probability that …rms hire workers from the a¤ected group.
7 Important contributions include Sappington (1983) , Park (1995) , Kim (1997) , Demougin and Fluet (2001) , Sappington (2000, 2001) , and Jewitt, Kadan, and Swinkels (2008) . 8 Building upon these seminal papers, multitasking problems are also analyzed by, e.g., Feltham and Xie (1994) , Datar, Kulp, and Lambert (2001) , Baker (2002 . 9 In a setting similar to Itoh (1994) , Itoh (2001) considers imperfect performance measurement as an extension. However, in contrast to us, he discusses how this a¤ects the principal's decision to delegate one or both of two tasks to an agent, where the non-delegated task is performed by the principal herself. In our model, the principal cannot perform any task herself. tarities between tasks may lead to task bundling, which is in line with the results of our model extension to complementary tasks. In a multitasking setting with both explicit and relational incentive contracting, Schöttner (2008) shows that broader task assignments may enhance relational employment contracts. Laux (2001) and Schmitz (2005) study pros and cons of task bundling under limited liability when individual (task-dependent) performance measures exist. Similar to our …rst result, Laux (2001) shows that the assignment of multiple projects to a single manager reduces managerial rents and thus expected wage costs. Schmitz (2005) considers the organization of a project that consists of two stages, at each of which a task has to be performed. Incentive considerations can explain the optimality of either separation or integration of tasks.
Finally, our paper is also related to neoclassical labor market models (see, e.g., Boeri and van Ours (2008) ), which explore minimum wages at an aggregate level. In competitive markets, these models predict negative e¤ects of minimum wages on aggregate employment while conclusions are ambiguous for non-competitive labor markets. 10 In a recent study, Amine and Lages Dos Santos (2011) analyze public policies in a matching model with heterogeneous workers and endogenous choice of the production technology. Abstracting from incentive problems and keeping the number of jobs in a …rm …xed, they …nd that …rms respond to an increase in the minimum wage or unemployment bene…t by making jobs more complex and recruiting more skilled workers. Our paper complements these aggregate models by o¤ering novel insights based on incentive considerations and job design at the …rm level.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the model and the …rst-best job design. In Section 3, we derive our results on optimal job design.
After discussing the feasible e¤ort allocations under the di¤erent job regimes in Section 3.1, we derive optimality conditions for specialization (Section 3.2), multitasking, and task exclusion (Section 3.3) . Subsequently, we analyze the consequences of variations in the wage ‡oor and the reservation utility on welfare and organizational design in Section 4.1 and discuss implications for labor market regulation. In Section 4.2, we extend our model to complementary tasks and also consider the case where the principal cannot exclude a task from an agent's job. Finally, Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The Model
Production Technology and Information Structure We consider a production process that requires the completion of two tasks. E¤ort in task i (i = 1; 2) is denoted by 1 0 See Manning (2003 Manning ( , 2010 for a comprehensive discussion of imperfect competition in labor markets. e i 0. E¤ort e i re ‡ects the diligence exercised by the worker who carries out task i. A task cannot be split between di¤erent workers. 11 The e¤ort levels' joint contribution to total …rm value is denoted by Y and is either high or low, Y 2 f0; 1g: The probability for Y = 1 is given by Pr[Y = 1 je 1 ; e 2 ] = minff 1 e 1 + f 2 e 2 ; 1g.
(
Here, f i > 0 is the marginal impact of e¤ort in task i on the expected contribution to …rm value. In addition, there is a joint performance measure P 2 f0; 1g for both tasks, with
Pr[P = 1 je 1 ; e 2 ] = minfg 1 e 1 + g 2 e 2 ; 1g.
Thus, g i > 0 is the marginal impact of e¤ort in task i on the expected value of the performance measure. Since both f i and g i are positive, increasing e¤ort in either task raises the expected realization of both …rm value and performance measure. However, because in general f i 6 = g i , a task's true productivity di¤ers from its impact on the performance measure. 12 For ease of exposition, we introduce vector notation and de…ne f = (f 1 ; f 2 ) T , g = (g 1 ; g 2 ) T , and e = (e 1 ; e 2 ) T . All vectors are column vectors and superscript T denotes transpose.
The …rm owner observes f i and g i , and the workers observe (at least) g i (i = 1; 2) before contracting takes place. A worker's e¤ort is his private information, implying a moralhazard problem and the need for the principal to provide e¤ort incentives. However, the tasks' contribution to …rm value, Y , is not observable and therefore not contractible. 13 Incentive contracts therefore have to rely on the performance measure P , which is observed by the …rm owner and the workers and is also veri…able by a court of law.
According to our speci…cation, Y and P are subject to exogenous random in ‡uences.
We do not impose any restriction on the underlying type of uncertainty. In particular, the random variables Y and P may be (imperfectly) correlated. For short, we refer to Y as …rm value in the remainder of the paper.
Job Design and Timing The …rm owner (principal) cannot perform any of the tasks herself. For execution of the tasks, she can choose between three job designs: specialization, 1 1 For instance, in a fast-food restaurant, only one person can operate a particular cash register or clean a particular table.
1 2 We could also assume that one of the tasks, say task 1, is indispensable for realizing a high …rm value and/or a high performance measure, i.e., Pr[Y = 1 je1 = 0; e2 ] = 0 and/or Pr[P = 1 je1 = 0; e2 ] = 0 for all e2 0, whereas (1) and (2) apply if e1 > 0 and e2 0. For example, task 1 is indispensable to obtain P = 1 if this task is a production task and P = 1 means that the good has been produced (while task 2 could be the maintenance of the asset required for production). Assuming that task 1 is indispensable would lead to exactly the same results as the above speci…cation because our optimal contract will always induce strictly positive e¤ort in task 1.
1 3 For example, it is not observable how the activities in a particular fast-food restaurant contribute to the value of the whole chain. task exclusion, and multitasking. Under specialization, the principal employs two workers (agents), each carrying out one task. Otherwise, the principal hires only one agent who either performs only one task (task exclusion) or both tasks (multitasking). In the former case, the agent is forbidden to exert e¤ort in the excluded task and, consequently, this task is not performed at all. 14 Timing is as follows. First, the principal determines the job design. If she hires only one agent, she o¤ers this agent an employment contract. The contract speci…es the task assignment (either both tasks, or only task 1, or only task 2), a …xed wage s, and a bonus b to be paid if the performance measure is favorable, i.e., if P = 1. The agent thus receives s if P = 0 and s + b if P = 1. If the agent accepts the contract, he exerts e¤ort. Then, P is realized and payments are made.
By contrast, under specialization, the principal proposes each of the two agents a separate contract. For simplicity, an agent is identi…ed with the task i he is supposed to perform. Thus, the contract for agent i speci…es that he will carry out task i, receive a …xed wage s i , and a bonus b i if P = 1. Given that both agents accept the contract, they simultaneously exert e¤ort in their tasks. Afterwards, P is realized and the agents are paid. 
Agents'Characteristics
where
c 1 ; c 2 > 0, and c 12 2 [0; p c 1 c 2 ). 15 When c 12 is strictly positive, the tasks compete for the agent's attention in the sense that an agent who is already responsible for one task …nds it harder to engage in another one, i.e., tasks are substitutes. Consequently, for any given pair of positive e¤ort levels (e 1 ; e 2 ), total e¤ort costs are lower under specialization than under multitasking. The opposite case of complementary tasks is discussed in Section 4.2.
We assume that f , g, and C are such that the probabilities in (1) and (2) remain strictly below one at the …rst-best and second-best solution. 16 An agent accepts the principal's job o¤er if it guarantees him an expected wage payment net of e¤ort costs of at least 1 4 We thus assume that the principal can enforce that a task is not executed (compare Footnote 2 in the Introduction). If this was not possible, however, our analysis would proceed in a very similar way. We discuss this case in Section 4.2.
1 5 The restriction c12 < p c1c2 ensures that the cost function is strictly convex and the matrix C is positive de…nite.
1 6 Hence, from now on we will simply write Pr[Y = 1je1; e2] = f1e1 + f2e2 = f T e and Pr[P = 1je1
u 0, i.e., u denotes an agent's reservation utility.
Wage Floors Due to exogenous restrictions, the wage of an agent must meet or exceed some given wage ‡oor in each state of the world. The applicable wage ‡oor may depend on the number of tasks assigned to the agent. If the agent performs only one task, this wage ‡oor is w. We allow w to take values from the interval [ 1; 1). In case w 0, we can interpret w as a minimum wage. By contrast, if 1 < w < 0, the …rm can extract payments from the agent, but the latter is protected by limited liability (or has limited wealth). Finally, the case w = 1 corresponds to a situation without any restrictions on wage payments. If the agent performs two tasks, his wage ‡oor is denoted w m w.
The case w m = w applies when the wage ‡oor re ‡ects a liability limit or is due to an hourly or monthly minimum wage but an agent's working hours are independent of his task assignment. 17 If, however, an agent's working hours can be reduced when he performs only one task, a wage ‡oor dictated by an hourly minimum wage is higher under multitasking than under single-task assignments, i.e., w m > w.
First-best Job Design As a benchmark, we now characterize the optimal job design if e¤ort is contractible. To do so, we derive the e¤ort levels that maximize expected …rm value net of e¤ort costs under all possible job regimes and compare the resulting pro…ts.
First consider the case of specialization. The optimal e¤ort levels then are
yielding the pro…t
To ensure that considering specialization is worthwhile, we assume that
implying that each agent's net contribution to …rm value is positive. For the further analysis, it will prove helpful to de…ne the vector
Intuitively, f s re ‡ects the tasks' net productivities under specialization, i.e., the tasks' productivities f corrected by the cost di¤erences across tasks. Without loss of generality we assume that task 1 has a weakly higher net productivity, i.e., f 1 = p c 1 f 2 = p c 2 , and is thus more important to the …rm than task 2. We say that the tasks are asymmetric when the former inequality is strict.
If the principal hires only one agent and assigns both tasks to him, optimal e¤ort is
We assume that both e¤ort levels e M 1 , e M 2 are strictly positive, i.e., c 12 is not too large.
This immediately implies that task exclusion cannot be …rst-best. The surplus-maximizing e¤ort levels with one agent thus are
which we assume to be positive. Here, C 1 denotes the inverse of C, which exists because C is positive de…nite.
Compared to multitasking, specialization has the advantage of lower total e¤ort costs, but the disadvantage that two agents have to be compensated for their forgone outside option u. In line with one of the main arguments for specialization, namely the cost advantage through the division of labor, we want to focus on situations where the bene…ts of specialization outweigh its costs, i.e., S M . Such a situation occurs if c 12 is su¢ ciently large relative to u and includes the special case c 12 = u = 0, where the principal is indi¤erent between specialization and multitasking in the …rst-best world. We thus make the following assumption.
Assumption 1
The …rst-best e¤ ort levels and the …rst-best pro…t are e S and S , respectively. Thus, specialization weakly dominates both multitasking and task exclusion when e¤ ort is contractible.
Assumption 1 will imply that specialization is also the second-best job design when wage ‡oors are su¢ ciently low, which greatly simpli…es the exposition of the paper. 18 Restricting attention to S M and thus c 12 0 is, however, not a necessary ingredient for any of the following results as we show in Section 4.2.
Optimal Job Design
In this section, we derive the optimal allocation of tasks in the presence of moral hazard.
After presenting some preliminary results in the …rst subsection, we subsequently derive optimality conditions for specialization, multitasking, and task exclusion.
Feasible E¤ort Allocations under the Di¤erent Job Designs
We …rst derive two preliminary results concerning the set of feasible e¤ort levels, i.e., the e¤ort allocation that the principal can induce under the di¤erent job regimes. To do so, we consider the stage of the game where, given the job design and employment contract(s), e¤ort is chosen by the agent(s).
Under specialization, agent i chooses his e¤ort e i to maximize his expected wage net of e¤ort costs, taking the e¤ort level of worker j as given, i.e.,
The principal can thus induce every arbitrary pair of e¤ort levels (e 1 ; e 2 ) by o¤ering the
. This is the case even though P is not identical to …rm value Y , implying that the agents care about the realization of P rather than Y . However, this is not detrimental because the principal can pay agents individual bonuses, which allows to …ne-tune incentives to the di¤erent tasks in any desired way.
Lemma 1 Under specialization, the principal can induce each arbitrary pair of e¤ ort levels. In particular, the …rst-best e¤ ort allocation e S is always feasible.
By contrast, under multitasking, it is not possible to provide individual incentives for the two tasks. Assuming C 1 g > 0 to ensure an interior solution to the agent's problem, the agent chooses the e¤ort levels e = arg max
Hence, the principal is extremely restricted in the set of e¤ort levels she is able to induce.
We obtain the following Lemma, which replicates a result from Proposition 1 in Schöttner
Lemma 2 Under multitasking, the principal can induce only those e¤ ort levels e that are multiples of the vector C 1 g. In particular, the surplus-maximizing e¤ ort allocation e M is feasible if and only if f = g for some real number > 0 or, equivalently,
If f 1 =f 2 = g 1 =g 2 , we call the performance measure perfect and otherwise imperfect.
In the latter case, the principal cannot induce the surplus-maximizing e¤ort levels under multitasking because there is no bonus that makes the agent internalize the tasks' true contribution to …rm value. Task exclusion, on the other hand, forces the agent to focus on only one task, thereby ruling out a misallocation of e¤ort across tasks. This allows the principal to induce an arbitrary e¤ort level in one task which comes, however, at the cost of zero e¤ort in the other task. Thus, when e¤ort is non-observable and the performance measure is imperfect, specialization has a further important advantage over multitasking and task exclusion: Specialization does not restrict the set of implementable e¤ort levels. 19
Optimality Conditions for Specialization and the Bene…t of Imperfect Performance Measures
In this subsection, we …rst determine the circumstances under which the principal …nds it optimal to induce …rst-best e¤ort under specialization, which provides us with a su¢ -cient condition for the optimality of this job design. This condition enables us to discuss how the implementation of the …rst-best solution is a¤ected by the quality of the performance measure. Moreover, we derive a su¢ cient condition for the principal to abandon specialization.
Anticipating the agents' e¤ort choices under a given contract, as described by (11), the principal's optimization problem under specialization is:
When maximizing expected …rm value minus wage costs, the principal has to take into account the agents'incentive compatibility and participation constraints, (IC S ) and (PC S ), respectively. Moreover, the wage- ‡oor constraints (WC S ) and (WC 0 S ) must be satis…ed. To simplify the principal's problem, …rst note that we can drop the constraints s i + b i w because from (IC S ) it is clear that we can focus on non-negative bonuses. Furthermore, we can use (IC S ) to replace e i . We then obtain from agent i's participation and wage- ‡oor constraint that, for given bonuses b i and b j , his optimal …xed wage satis…es
To shorten notation, we now de…ne a vector g s analogous to f s ,
Hence, after substituting s i , the principal's optimization problem becomes:
2 is the expected …rm value for given bonuses b 1 and b 2 . The next expression is the principal's expected wage payment to agent 1. If the bonuses are
, then the …xed payment s 1 can be chosen such that agent 1's participation constraint is binding. Otherwise, the agent earns a rent under the bonuses b 1 and b 2 , i.e., his expected wage payment net of e¤ort costs exceeds his reservation utility. Importantly, in the latter case, agent 1's expected payment also depends on the bonus paid to agent 2. The reason is that agent 2's incentives a¤ect agent 1's probability of earning his own bonus: The higher b 2 , the harder agent 2 works.
Consequently, the probability that the agents'joint performance measure P is favorable rises and, thus, agent 1's expected bonus payment also increases. The part of agent 1's expected payment that results from agent 2's e¤ort is exactly (g s 2 ) 2 b 1 b 2 because
where the last equation follows from the incentive-compatibility constraints (IC S ). An analogous explanation holds for agent 2's expected wage, which is given by the term in the second line of (II S ).
Let S (u; w) denote the principal's pro…t under the solution to problem (II S ). Using (IC S ), we can rewrite (II S ) as a function of e¤ort, which will be useful for the further analysis. We thus obtain: Figure 1 depicts whether the principal has to pay rents to agent 1 and 2, respectively, for inducing a given e¤ort pair (e 1 ; e 2 ). The …gure is plotted for the case g 1 = g 2 , c 1 = c 2 = 1, and w < u. If the e¤ort pair belongs to area A 1 , then no agent earns a rent. 20 In area A 2 , agent 1 obtains a rent but not agent 2, whereas area A 3 corresponds to the opposite case. Finally, in area A 4 , both agents earn rents. As w increases and, consequently, u w decreases, A 4 becomes larger relative to the other areas. Moreover, if u w, then A 1 ,
A 2 , and A 3 disappear. Thus, if the wage ‡oor is at least as high as the reservation utility, both agents earn a rent for every pair of positive e¤ort levels. Proposition 1 characterizes the circumstances under which specialization leads to the …rst-best solution.
Proposition 1
The principal induces the …rst-best e¤ ort levels e S and obtains the …rst-best pro…t S under specialization if and only if w u R, where
2 0 De…ne q := Consequently, w u R is a su¢ cient condition for specialization being the optimal job design.
Inequality (FB) ensures that w is such that the principal does not need to pay rents for making the agents exert …rst-best e¤ort, i.e., e S belongs to area A 1 in Figure 1 .
The principal then has no reason to induce ine¢ cient e¤ort levels by o¤ering ine¢ cient bonuses. This is the case if the wage ‡oor w is su¢ ciently low and, in particular, if no wage ‡oor exists (w = 1). In the spirit of Holmström (1982) , the principal can act as a budget breaker in the team production process that is implied by specialization:
She can always install a bonus scheme such that each agent is compensated with the full expected marginal return of his individual contribution to the team output Y (see Lemma 1). However, maximizing the expected residual from the production process instead of the expected team output, the principal o¤ers such bonuses only if she can extract the agents' associated surpluses by su¢ ciently low …xed wages. Otherwise, i.e., if w is su¢ ciently high, the well-known trade-o¤ between rent extraction and e¢ ciency leads to a distortion of incentives (see, e.g., La¤ont and Martimort (2001) ).
Proposition 1 also points out that the relative size of w and u is crucial for the principal's decision whether to induce …rst-best e¤ort. Notably, w needs to be strictly lower than u. In other words, the principal already starts distorting agents'incentives in order to save rent payments when the wage ‡oor is strictly below the reservation utility. Proposition 1 additionally reveals that the relation between …rm value and the performance measure is also substantial for attaining the …rst-best. This is because R depends on the net productivities of the tasks with respect to …rm value, f s i , and with respect to the performance measure, g s i . More speci…cally, the lower the term R, the longer the …rst-best will be sustained, i.e., the larger the wage ‡oor can be before the principal optimally distorts incentives. Surprisingly, it turns out that R takes its minimum for an imperfect performance measure P whenever tasks are asymmetric. Thus, under specialization, the principal can bene…t from an imperfect performance measure because it may allow her to induce the …rst-best solution for higher wage ‡oors w.
Corollary 1 If the net productivities of the tasks are identical, f s 1 = f s 2 , then R is minimal for
, i.e., for a perfect performance measure P . By contrast, if f s 1 > f s 2 , then R takes its minimum for
, i.e., for an imperfect performance measure that overemphasizes task 2 relative to task 1 compared to the tasks'true marginal productivities.
If the tasks di¤er in their importance to the …rm, a distorted performance measure is bene…cial because it may enable the principal to avoid rent payments to the agents when implementing the bonuses that induce …rst-best e¤ort, b S i = f i =g i . To understand the intuition, it is helpful to rewrite R as
This shows that R is minimal when the agents' expected bonus payments net of e¤ort costs are identical under the …rst-best solution. Under a perfect performance measure, however, the principal pays identical bonuses to the agents, b S 1 = b S 2 . The reason is that, when …rm value Y and the performance measure P are perfectly aligned, it is not necessary to correct the agent's marginal incentives by o¤ering di¤erent individual bonuses.
Consequently, agent 1's expected bonus net of e¤ort costs is lower than agent 2's because agent 1 incurs higher costs in the more valuable task. As a result, as w increases and the bonuses b S i are retained, agent 2 earns a rent before agent 1 does. At this point, if the principal uses an imperfect performance measure with
, she can lower agent 2's bonus below that of agent 1. Then, a situation without rents can be sustained for a larger range of wage ‡oors. In other words, an imperfect performance measure allows to equalize agents'expected payments when, due to the wage ‡oor, the …xed wages s i can no longer serve this purpose.
From Proposition 1, we know that the principal refrains from inducing …rst-best e¤ort levels once the wage ‡oor is so large that condition (FB) is violated. The next proposition shows that, as the wage ‡oor w continues to increase, at some point the principal switches from specialization to the employment of only one agent.
Proposition 2 There is a threshold w 2 (u R; u] such that the principal prefers to hire only one agent if w w. Thus, w w is a su¢ cient condition for the principal to abandon specialization. Moreover, we have w < u for all u > 0. Hence, the principal gives up specialization already for wage ‡oors that are strictly below any positive reservation utility.
Why is it optimal to hire only one agent as soon as the wage ‡oor w exceeds a certain threshold that is even strictly below the agents' reservation utility? The proof of Proposition 2 shows that, under specialization, the principal does not provide incentives for the less important task 2 whenever w u. Consequently, e¤ort in task 2 is zero. This is because w is so large relative to u that both agents earn rents for each pair of positive e¤ort levels or, equivalently, bonuses. Providing incentives for agent 2 is then too costly because each positive bonus b 2 increases the rent of both agents (compare (II S )) but makes only agent 2 to work harder. Therefore, the principal prefers to exclusively focus on the more important task 1. It follows immediately that the principal is then better o¤ by implementing task exclusion, i.e., she hires only one agent and excludes the less important task from his job. This saves the …xed wage s = w for agent 2, while everything else remains equal. When these wage cost savings are strictly positive (which is guaranteed if u > 0), the principal's pro…t with one agent is strictly larger than the pro…t with two agents. Since the pro…t functions are continuous in w under each job regime, it then follows that task exclusion dominates specialization for wage ‡oors w that are strictly below u. Proposition 2 is related to Proposition 1 in Itoh (1994) , which also shows that abandoning specialization may be optimal in a team production environment with two tasks that are substitutes in an agent's cost function. In Itoh (1994) , agents are risk averse and the driving force behind Itoh's result is that the principal can decrease risk costs when she hires only one agent. Similarly, in our framework, the principal gives up specialization when agents'rents would be rather large under this job regime. Proposition 3 Assume that c 1 = c 2 = 1, c 12 = u = 0, and w = w m . As soon as w is such that at least one agent receives a rent under the optimal contract for the specialized job regime, the principal prefers to hire only one agent.
Proposition 2 was derived on the grounds that a su¢ ciently high wage ‡oor (w u)
would trigger rent payments to both agents under specialization whenever the principal induces positive e¤ort in both tasks, which is therefore never optimal for the principal.
Proposition 3 shows that the principal may actually abandon specialization much earlier, namely, before any of the two agents earns a rent under specialization. 21 The reason is that there is a range of wage ‡oors for which the principal already distorts incentives under specialization, but does not leave rents to the agents yet.
Optimality Conditions for Multitasking and Task Exclusion
In this subsection, we focus on a situation where w w, i.e., when it is already clear from Proposition 2 that the principal hires only one agent because task exclusion dominates specialization. The question then is whether the principal can improve upon task exclusion by implementing multitasking. If e¤ort was contractible, task exclusion would not be part of the surplus-maximizing contract with one agent, which induces e¤ort e M 1 ; e M 2 > 0 and pro…t M (see Section 2). However, with unobservable e¤ort, the principal can elicit these e¤ort levels only if the performance measure is perfect (Lemma 2). With an imperfect performance measure, excluding task 2 from the job has the advantage that the agent is forced to focus on the more productive task, thereby avoiding a misallocation of e¤ort across tasks. On the downside, however, task 2 is not performed at all. Thus, presumably, the usefulness of the performance measure for e¤ectively directing e¤ort to the di¤erent tasks determines the attractiveness of multitasking compared to task exclusion.
To measure this quality of the performance measure, we use the concept introduced by Schöttner (2008) . 22 Accordingly, we de…ne the vectors f m = Sf and g m = Sg, were S is a 2x2-matrix with S T S = C 1 . 23 Hence, the vectors f m and g m are the tasks'marginal productivities appropriately weighted by the parameters from the agent's cost function.
To understand the intuition, consider the example f = (1; 2) T , and c 12 = 0. Then, the relative overemphasis of task 2 in the performance measure is mitigated as the cost parameter for task 2, c 2 , increases. The reason is that cost considerations make the agent direct relatively more e¤ort towards task 1. Thus, even though f and g do not change, the alignment of Y and P and, consequently, the quality of the performance measure improves. More precisely, the alignment of Y and P is re ‡ected by the angle between the vectors f m and g m , which we denote by . Consequently, cos can serve as a measure of alignment or, equivalently, of how useful the performance measure is for providing incentives. The lower cos , the larger the angle and hence the worse aligned are Y and P .
Analogously to vector f s , which re ‡ects the tasks'net productivities under specialization, vector f m characterizes the tasks'net productivities under multitasking. We obtain f s = f m in the special case of independent tasks, i.e., if c 12 = 0. If c 12 > 0, however, f m is di¤erent from f s because the former vector has to take into account the increased e¤ort costs under multitasking.
We now investigate how optimal contracting under multitasking is a¤ected by the 2 2 Baker (2002) proposed this measure of alignment for independent and equally costly tasks (i.e., c12 = 0 and c1 = c2 = 1).
2 3 See Schöttner (2008, p. 143 ) for how to compute S. For the simple case of independent tasks, c12 = 0,
existence of a wage ‡oor and the degree of alignment of performance measure and …rm value. If the principal assigns both tasks to a single agent, her optimization problem is max e;s;b
The principal maximizes the expectation of …rm value minus wage payments, subject to the agent's incentive-compatibility constraint (IC M ) (which follows from (12)), his participation constraint (PC M ), and the wage- ‡oor constraint (WC M ). 24 Recall that the wage ‡oor under multitasking may di¤er from that under specialization or task exclusion;
w m w. The following Lemma characterizes the optimal contract under multitasking. To shorten notation, we denote by jj jj the length of a vector, i.e., jjf m jj =
Lemma 3 and earns the expected pro…t
The agent Furthermore, Lemma 3 shows that the principal's pro…t is increasing in D and, hence, in the alignment between …rm value and performance measure, cos . Intuitively, the more useful the performance measure for providing incentives, the higher powered will be the agent's bonus contract. Consequently, the principal's pro…t increases. In the absence of a wage ‡oor, Schöttner (2008, p. 144) has derived the same result. However, in the given case with a wage ‡oor, a high bonus also implies that the agent is more likely to earn a rent.
Thus, the higher cos , the lower the threshold on the wage ‡oor above which a rent is paid to the agent. The maximum surplus M = jjf m jj 2 2 u is attained only if cos = 1 and, additionally, w m is su¢ ciently small, w m u jjf m jj 2 2 = M . In particular, this means that the wage ‡oor must be negative. Finally, the pro…t under multitasking decreases in the degree of task substitutability, c 12 . The reason is that a higher c 12 diminishes the net productivity of the agent's e¤ort and, moreover, also exacerbates the misallocation of 2 6 For a detailed discussion of welfare e¤ects of w and u see Section 4.1. e¤ort across tasks, i.e., both jjf m jj and cos decrease. 27 We now use the results on multitasking to establish the optimal job design when the principal hires only one agent.
Proposition 4 Assume that w w, i.e., the principal hires only one agent. If a task is excluded from the agent's job, this will always be task 2. (i) If w m = w, the principal excludes task 2 if and only if f s 1 jjf m jj cos . Otherwise, the principal assigns both tasks to the agent. (ii) If w m > w, a su¢ cient condition for multitasking is that f s 1 < jjf m jj cos and w m ŵ, whereŵ is implicitly de…ned as M (u;ŵ) =
Proposition 4 shows that, if the principal excludes a task, this will be task 2, which has the lower net productivity under specialization. In case (i), wage ‡oors are independent of the task assignment. Then, for given net productivities under task exclusion and multitasking, f s 1 and f m , respectively, task 2 should not be performed if the performance measure is su¢ ciently distortive (i.e., cos is low). Excluding task 2 then prevents a relatively severe misallocation of e¤ort across tasks by forcing the agent to focus on task 1 only.
If, however, the performance measure is perfect (cos = 1), the agent should always carry out both tasks. 28 On the other hand, holding the alignment of an imperfect performance measure (i.e., cos < 1) …xed, exclusion of task 2 is optimal if task 1's net productivity, f s 1 , is su¢ ciently large compared to the two tasks'joint net productivity under multitasking, jjf m jj. Multitasking is then so exhausting for the agent that, in combination with imperfect performance measurement, the principal is better o¤ avoiding it. Moreover, because the pro…t under multitasking or, equivalently, jjf m jj cos decreases in c 12 , a stronger substitutability between tasks makes multitasking less likely. Finally, whether task exclusion is optimal or not does not depend on u and w = w m . This is because these parameters have the same impact on the principal's pro…t under task exclusion and multitasking. Now consider case (ii), which occurs if the wage ‡oor is due to an hourly minimum wage and multitasking leads to a longer working time. Then the high wage ‡oor under multitasking may prevent the principal from adopting this job design even if the performance measure is relatively e¤ective, i.e., f s 1 < jjf m jj cos . Multitasking occurs only if w m is not too large (w m ŵ).
To summarize, when the principal hires only one agent, exclusion of the less important task can be optimal for two reasons. First, it forces the agent to focus on the more productive task, thereby avoiding a misallocation of e¤ort across tasks that occurs under multitasking when the performance measure is imperfect. Second, the minimum wage that 2 7 Schöttner (2008, p.148 ) provides a formal proof and an intuition. 2 8 The inequality f s 1 < jjf m jj holds because, by the assumptions made in Section 2,
u, the pro…t under task exclusion.
has to be paid to an agent who works long hours due to multitasking is too large.
Discussion and Extensions

E¤ects of Changes in the Wage Floor and the Reservation Utility on Welfare and Organizational Design
Our previous results -in particular those from Proposition 1 and 2 and Lemma 3 -show that the optimal job design, optimal incentive contracts, …rm pro…t, and worker rents crucially depend on the relative size of the reservation utility and the wage ‡oor. This suggests that exogenous changes in the two parameters should a¤ect both the optimal organizational design and total welfare. Interestingly, we can demonstrate that equally directed changes in the reservation utility and the wage ‡oor usually have opposing e¤ects.
Opposing e¤ects on welfare are present even if the organizational design cannot be adapted.
To see this, assume that the job design is exogenously …xed to multitasking. From Lemma 3 it follows that the expected total surplus from the employment relationship, i.e., the sum of the principal's expected pro…t and the agent's expected payment net of e¤ort costs, is
given by:
Accordingly, is a function of the di¤erence between the reservation utility and the wage ‡oor, u w m , and is weakly increasing in this di¤erence. strictly increases in u w m in the intermediate case
u w m < D, where both the agent's participation constraint and the wage ‡oor constraint are binding. A higher reservation utility then enhances welfare because the principal responds to a higher u by raising the bonus, which entails higher total surplus. At the same time, the agent's net payo¤ increases. By contrast, a marginal increase in the wage ‡oor leads to weaker incentives and lower welfare. It has, however, no e¤ect on the agent's payo¤ as long as D 4 < u w m . The reason for the opposing e¤ects of the two parameters on the total surplus is that they a¤ect the principal's incentive contracting problem in fundamentally di¤erent ways: The reservation utility determines the minimum ex-ante expected payment to the agent whereas the wage ‡oor stipulates a lower bound on ex-post payments. When the former increases, the principal is forced to leave a larger share of the expected total surplus to the agent, which she optimally achieves by increasing the bonus and keeping the …xed wage constant. By contrast, if the wage ‡oor increases, the principal has to increase the …xed wage, which she optimally counteracts by lowering the bonus. In the two remaining cases, if D u w m or u w m < D 4 , marginal changes in u and w m only have redistributive e¤ects. In the …rst (second) case, an increase in u (w m ) leads to a redistribution of pro…t from the principal to the agent via the …xed wage, while marginal changes in w m (u) have no e¤ect at all. Overall, a higher reservation utility weakly increases the expected total surplus from the employment relationship, whereas a higher wage ‡oor weakly diminishes total surplus. Moreover, with an increased wage ‡oor, the agent obtains a strictly larger share of the surplus only if the wage ‡oor is relatively high, i.e., u w m < D 4 . Otherwise, the agent's expected payo¤ is strictly increasing in u. 29 Importantly, our analysis shows that opposing e¤ects of changes in the reservation utility and the wage ‡oor on welfare persist when the organizational design is endogenous.
Moreover, there are also opposing e¤ects on the optimal job design. By Proposition 1 and 2, respectively, the principal employs the …rst-best job design, specialization, if u w R but hires only one agent if u w 0. Thus, a higher wage ‡oor makes specialization less likely, while a su¢ ciently large reservation utility will lead to specialization. 30 The foregoing discussion has important implications for the functioning of regulatory labor market instruments. A possible interpretation of the agents'reservation utility are unemployment bene…ts. Since we consider a one-period model, this is saying that, if the worker rejects the …rm's contract o¤er at the beginning of the period, he cannot …nd a new job within the same period. This assumption is reasonable if the considered period is su¢ ciently short and there is some unemployment on the labor market. An example of a wage ‡oor with high empirical and political relevance is the legal minimum wage.
The …rst minimum wage was introduced in the United States in 1938. Although the minimum wage has always been a controversial policy, by now the majority of countries have legally implemented some form of a minimum wage. The commonly stated primary goals of introducing a minimum wage are correcting for market ine¢ ciencies due to, e.g., monopsonistic power or informational asymmetries and reducing earnings inequality and poverty by supporting low-income groups of the population (compare Boeri and van Ours (2008), p. 46) . Whether the minimum wage is indeed e¤ective in achieving these goals is 2 9 An analogous discussion applies if the job design is …xed to task exclusion. Total surplus is then increasing in u w. Fixing the job design to specialization, we similarly obtain opposing e¤ects of changes in u and w. Proposition 1 shows that the …rst-best total surplus is realized if u w is su¢ ciently large, i.e., u w R.
3 0 If u R + w and u further increases so that Assumption 1 is …nally violated, an increase in the reservation utility still enhances total welfare. The …rst-best job design is then multitasking but the associated …rst-best surplus from the employment relationship, M + u, cannot be attained with an imperfect performance measure. For su¢ ciently low values of u, specialization is still the optimal job design because it solves the problem of e¤ort misallocation. The principal, however, abandons specialization when u gets su¢ ciently large. At this point, the workers are not worse o¤ than under specialization because one of them earns (at least) u in the …rm while the dismissed worker obtains the reservation utility outside the …rm. By the analysis at the beginning of this subsection, a further increase in u has a positive e¤ect on total welfare. a matter of frequent discussion and investigation. 31 Even though our analysis does not allow to draw conclusions at an aggregate level, it contributes to the debate by highlighting possibly distinct consequences of minimum wages and unemployment bene…ts for organizational design and welfare. In our model, if unemployment bene…ts are small enough for specialization to maximize total surplus (i.e., Assumption 1 holds) and no minimum wage exists, the …rm will choose specialization. The introduction of a minimum wage then has a quite di¤erent e¤ect on welfare and work organization than an increase in the unemployment bene…t: Establishing a minimum wage that forces the …rm to increase workers' …xed wages necessarily implies that the …rm induces an ine¢ cient e¤ort allocation and, consequently, welfare decreases. Workers may, however, earn rents due to the minimum wage. Yet the latter may also induce the …rm to dismiss one of the workers. Notably, this happens already for a minimum wage below the level of the unemployment bene…t (compare Proposition 2). By contrast, a higher unemployment bene…t has no e¤ect on e¤ort e¢ ciency and employment as long as the …rm still …nds it pro…table to hire two workers (i.e., Assumption 1 continues to hold). Moreover, a higher unemployment bene…t guarantees specialized workers a larger income because it forces the …rm to reward workers accordingly.
Thus, from an e¢ ciency perspective, minimum wages may exhibit a major disadvantage relative to labor market instruments stipulating a lower bound on overall expected net payments rather than …xed pay. Moreover, our results imply that the relative size of the wage ‡oor compared to the agents'reservation utility (u w and u w m , respectively) is decisive for optimal job design. In particular, the detrimental e¤ects of the minimum wage may be diminished by good outside opportunities on the side of the workers.
Model Extensions
Complementary Tasks So far, we have focused on a situation where tasks are either independent (c 12 = 0) or substitutes (c 12 > 0), i.e., they compete for an agent's attention.
However, tasks may also interact in an advantageous way such that the costs of one task decrease if the agent also performs the other one. Tasks are then complements (c 12 < 0). 32
In the introductory fast-food example, serving customers and selling food are presumably complementary tasks whereas cooking and cleaning are likely to be substitutes. With complementary tasks, Assumption 1 does not hold. The …rst-best job design then is multitasking because total e¤ort costs decrease if both tasks are performed by a single agent 3 1 For comprehensive overviews of the theory, the politics, and empirical evidence on the minimum wage see, e.g., Card and Krueger (1995) or Neumark and Wascher (2008) . A large body of empirical research investigates the overall employment e¤ects of minimum wages at an aggregate level. Yet there is a lack of consensus about its overall impact. For a review see Neumark and Wascher (2007) .
3 2 Convexity of the cost function requires that p c1c2 < c12.
and, moreover, the principal does not have to compensate a second agent for his reservation utility u (i.e., M > S ). Nevertheless, with unobservable e¤ort and imperfect performance measurement, the principal still prefers specialization to multitasking in the absence of wage ‡oors if the performance measure is su¢ ciently distortive and u is not too large. This is the case if the pro…t under specialization, S , is larger than the pro…t when employing only one agent, max M (u; 1); 1 2 (f s 1 ) 2 u , where the …rst term in brackets denotes the pro…t under multitasking and the second one is the pro…t under task exclusion. Accordingly, specialization is the second-best job design in the absence of wage ‡oors if and only if
Given that condition (18) holds, our above analysis regarding the e¤ect of an increasing wage ‡oor on the optimal job design continues to apply: The principal implements specialization if w u R (compare Proposition 1). As w increases above this threshold, at some point the principal switches from specialization to either task exclusion or multitasking (compare Proposition 2). Due to lower e¤ort costs, however, multitasking leads to a higher pro…t and will be implemented more often compared to a situation where c 12 0. 33
Our result on the optimality of an imperfect performance measure under specialization (Corollary 1) also continues to hold.
Regarding our discussion of the welfare e¤ects of variations in u and w, nothing changes under c 12 < 0 when the job design is …xed. When the job design is endogenous and condition (18) holds, u and w have the same opposing e¤ects on the optimal job design as under c 12 0. Note, however, that …rst-best welfare will only be realized when the performance measure is perfect, condition (18) does not hold, and the wage ‡oor is su¢ ciently small (w m u D, compare Lemma 3). Only then the principal chooses multitasking and induces …rst-best e¤ort.
Infeasibility of Task Exclusion Furthermore, we assumed that, if the principal hires only one agent, she can exclude one task from the agent's job. However, in some situations, the principal might not be able to control the set of tasks that a single agent engages in. If task exclusion is not feasible, the principal can choose only between specialization or multitasking. 34 A su¢ cient condition for the principal to abandon specialization then is that w exceeds the threshold w from Proposition 2 and a condition guaranteeing the optimality of multitasking in Proposition 4 holds. The principal thus still gives up specialization if w is su¢ ciently large, the quality of the performance measure is not too low, and the multitasking wage ‡oor w m is not too large relative to w.
Conclusion
An important question in organizational and labor economics is how …rms can structure jobs e¢ ciently. This paper is the …rst to present a moral-hazard model that simultaneously considers three important aspects of the …rm's job-design problem; asymmetric tasks, imperfect aggregate performance measures, and exogenous wage ‡oors. We show that lower bounds on wages may induce …rms to abandon e¢ cient specialized job regimes by redistributing tasks within the organization amongst fewer employees. This not only comes at the cost of ine¢ cient e¤ort incentives but also reduces the number of jobs in the …rm. Due to imperfect performance measurement, …rms may even entirely exclude less important tasks from the production process. Task exclusion is more likely if tasks di¤er strongly in their productivity or the aggregate performance measure does only poorly re‡ect the tasks'true relative productivities. Another important insight of this paper is that the consequences of imperfect performance measurement crucially depend on the organizational form. Regardless of the existence and size of a wage ‡oor, imperfect performance measures are always harmful under multitasking. Under specialization, however, …rms may bene…t from imperfect performance measurement: When tasks are asymmetric and a wage ‡oor exists, e¢ ciency is sustained longest for an imperfect performance measure that overemphasizes the less productive task appropriately.
Lastly, we show that exogenous changes in market conditions such as workers'reservation utilities and wage ‡oors may have quite di¤erent e¤ects on overall welfare and organizational design. In our model, higher reservation utilities usually enhance welfare while higher wage ‡oors entail lower welfare. Of course, practical implications should be considered with care because our model naturally is a simpli…cation of the complex issue of employment, worker motivation, and job design. In particular, we restrict attention to homogeneous agents in our model. If agents are heterogeneous, an increase in reservation utilities or wage ‡oors is likely to entail selection e¤ects that also have to be taken into account, e.g., regarding the productivity of workers who accept the contract. Nevertheless, our results contribute to the discussion of the e¤ectiveness of regulatory labor market instruments such as unemployment bene…ts and minimum wages by highlighting some practically relevant trade-o¤s in the presence of moral hazard.
Another implication from our analysis concerns the pro…tability of investments in performance assessments. Accounting for the fact that monitoring is usually imperfect, the paper focuses on the use of one given imperfect team performance measure. In practice, …rms can often improve the precision of performance evaluation by spending resources on additional performance measures. Returning to our introductory example, fast-food chains could for instance measure the restaurant's 'cleanliness'in addition to store pro…ts.
In this respect, our results imply that the existence of wage ‡oors can make investments in monitoring more pro…table for …rms. To see this, assume that, in our model, the principal can generate an additional, costly performance measure. In the absence of a wage ‡oor, the principal will nevertheless rely on the imperfect performance measure P and favor specialization. With large wage ‡oors, however, specialization becomes too expensive relative to multitasking in terms of rent payments. While the principal cannot avoid additional e¤ort costs under multitasking, she can solve the problem of e¤ort distortion by using the costly second performance measure. In particular, by appropriately weighting the two performance measures in an incentive contract, she can induce the surplus-maximizing e¤ort pair under multitasking. Hence, the principal invests in a second performance measure whenever the e¢ ciency loss under multitasking due to an imperfect performance measure exceeds the costs of generating the additional performance signal.
Finally, it is worth noting that our results do not hinge on the assumption of risk neutral agents. When agents are risk averse, total risk costs tend to be higher when the principal hires two agents rather than one. Risk aversion thus introduces a comparative disadvantage of specialization in addition to relatively high worker rents in the presence of wage ‡oors. Nevertheless, Proposition 1 in Itoh (1994) suggests that, in the absence of wage ‡oors, specialization is still optimal when the degree of substitutability between tasks is su¢ ciently high. With a su¢ ciently high wage ‡oor, the principal will again abandon specialization. Imperfect performance measurement can still have bene…cial e¤ects under specialization when it allows to lower an agent's bonus for implementing a given e¤ort level.
In fact, since lower bonuses now lead to lower rent payments and lower risk premiums, imperfect performance measurement may become even more advantageous than under risk neutrality. Also, task exclusion continues to constitute an optimal job design when specialization is too costly for the principal and performance measure quality is su¢ ciently low. If, as discussed above, the principal can invest in a second performance measure, she can bene…t from correlation between the two measures when agents are risk averse.
Appropriately designed incentive schemes can then be used to lower the agents'exposure to risk, thereby decreasing risk costs. For example, under specialization, the principal can do so by employing interdependent incentive schemes such as team compensation or relative performance pay (see, e.g, Mookherjee (1984) and Holmström and Milgrom (1990) ). When only one agent is hired, risk costs may be decreased by appropriately weighting the performance measures in his incentive contract.
Proof of Proposition 3. Due to its length, the proof is excluded from the paper and made available on the authors'websites.
Proof of Lemma 3. To solve the principal's problem, we …rst use equation (IC M ) to replace e in the principal's problem and also combine (PC M ) and (WC M ), which yields:
Hence, by substituting s, the principal's problem can be written as a function of the bonus b only:
There are three possible cases. At the optimal solution, either (i) only the participation constraint (PC M ) is binding, or (ii) only the wage ‡oor constraint (WC M ) is binding or (iii) both are binding. In case (i), the optimal bonus is 
In case (ii), the optimal bonus is b M W = 1=2 b P C . It occurs if
Finally, case (iii) occurs if 
By substituting the optimal bonuses in the objective function (34), we obtain the pro…t function M (u; w m ) given in the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 4. We …rst solve the principal's optimization problem under task exclusion and show that, if a task is excluded, this will be task 2. Assume that the agent performs task i, while task j 6 = i is excluded from the job. 
